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THE REPORT OF TI-IE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 11: AN UPDATE*

Stephen B. Burbankt
I.

INTRODUCTION

My goal in this article is to provide a fairly complete sum
mary of the work of the Third Circuit Task Force1 on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 1 , 2 anticipating some of the questions
* © 198 9 Stephen B. Burbank
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The author was the reporter of
the Tas k Force and principal author of its report. This text is adapted from re
marks delivered to the Third Circuit .Judicial Conference on September 19, 1988.
They introduced a pro gram, put together b y a committee chaired by .Judge Sarokin,
that was devoted entirelv to the work of the Task F o rce, which was then reflected in
,
a discussion d raft. Foll owing the Conference, and in the light of the discussion
t h ere and other comments received , the report was revis ed. It has now been pub
lished by, and is availabl e from, the American Judicature Society. See RuLE II IN
TRANSITION: THE REPORT or THE THIRD CIRCUIT TAsK FoRCE ON FEDERAL RuLE or
CIVIL PROCEDURE I I

( !989).

It is impo rtant to acknowledge the extraordinarv efforts of the district court
clerks and their s talls, led by iV!ike Kunz of the Eas tern Dis t rict of Pennsylvania, and
of Sal l y Mrvo s , the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, and her staff, who were instru
mental in the col l ection of the most important empirical data.
1 The members of the Task Force were:
Honorable John P. Fullam, Chair
Professor Stephen B. Burbank, Reporter
Alice W. Ballard, Esq.
Honorable Alan N . Bloch
Edmund N. Carpenter, II, Esq.
Barry H. Garfinkel, Esq.
Professor A. Leo Levin
S. Gerald Litvin, Esq.
W. Thomas iVIcGough, Jr., Esq.
David H. Marion, Esq
Melvill e D. Miller, Jr., Esq.
Robert G. Rose. Esq.
Professor Linda Jov Silberman
Wil l iam K. Slate, II, Esq.
Jerold S. Sol ovv, Esq.
Henry vV. Sa\\·yer. IlL Esq.
Richard J Seidel, Esq.
In addition, Chiefjudge Gibbons, who appointed the Task Force, \\·as an acti\c
participant in its discussions . .Judge Gibbons' retirement from the Third Circuit is
the bench's loss and Seton Halt Lt\\' School's gain.
2 As amended in 1983 an d , to make it gender neutral, in 1987, Rule 11
pro\'ides:
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readers of its report may have as well as highlighting some of the
more difficult choices we faced. I will not be able to cover all of
the territory, including in particular all of our empirical findings .
I hope, however, that by the end of this piece the reader will have
a good sense not only of what we recommend but of why we rec
ommend it.
The goals of the 1988 Third Circuit J udicial Conference
were to stimulate discussion and knowledge about a legal topic of
great controversy and to focus attention on the matters treated in
the discussion draft generated by the Task Force and on those
matters that were not, but should have been, treated there.3
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report contains, in the text, almost an equal mix of the
normative and the empirical, and it may be useful to explain why
it was written in this manner . We could have confined ourselves
to the collection and analysis of empirical data and to recommen
dations supported by such data . That certainly would have
marked a change in discourse about Rule 1 1, which has tended to
SIGNING O F PLEA DINGS, MOTIONS, AN D OTHER PAPERS;
SAN CTIONS
Every p leading, mo tion, and other paper of a party represented b y
a n attorney shall be signed by at leas t one at torney o f record i n the at
torney's individual name, whose address shall be s tated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shal l sign the party's p leading, m o tion,
or other paper and s tate the party's address. Excep t when o t herwis e
speciftcally p rovided by rule or s tatute, pleadings need not be verified o r
accompanied by affidavit . T h e ruie i n equity t h a t t h e averments o f an
answer under oath mus t be overcome by the testimony of t w o witnesses
or o f one witness sus tained by corroborating circums tances is abolish e d .
T h e signature o f an attorney or party cons titutes a certificate b y the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, mo tion. o r o th e r paper;
that to the bes t of the signer's knowledge. information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grout�decl in fac t and is war
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, m o di
fication, or reversal of existing law, and that i t is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary d elay o r
needless increase i n the cos t o f litigation. If a pl eading, m otion, or
o ther paper is not signed, i t s hall be s tricken unless it is signed p ro mp t l y
after the omission i s called to t h e attention of the pleader o r m ovan t . I f
a pleading. mo tion, o r other paper i s signed in violation o f this rule. the
court, upon mo tion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represellled party, or both, an approp riate sanc
tion, wh ich may include an o rder to pay to the o ther party or parties the
amount o f the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing o f the
pl eading, m o tion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee .
FED. R. CIV. P. II.
:� See supra note t; see also inJi·a notes 38 & 39.
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be dominated by "cosmic anecdotes"4 on one side (cos t s ) and
confident assertions on the other (benefits).
We chose not to do so for a variety of reasons. First, it
seemed important to develop an analytical framework in order to
determine what data to collect and to formulate hypotheses for
testing with those data. Second, we were aware that Rule 11 ju
risprudence is in a dynamic state and that it is developing in dif
ferent ways in different parts of the country. We thus were aware
that our empirical data-or rather some of them-would be of
limited utility in evaluating the Rule in other circuits, and we
wanted to assist others who might conduct similar studies in
those circuits. Third, there are a number of important questions
about Rule 11 that even ambitious empirical work is not likely to
answer. However, the issues could be illuminated by careful
analysis and broadly-based conceptual approaches. Too much of
the existing literature suffers from preoccupation with discrete
doctrinal questions-for instance, does Rule 1 1 impose a contin
uing obligation, or is there a duty of mitigation . As a result,
there is a risk of missing the forest for the trees. We have aimed
for the forest, aware, but not concerned, that we would miss
some trees.
III.

NoRMATIVE PERSPECTIVES

The first half of the report proceeds from our view that both
the interpretation of amended Rule 1 1 and practice under it are
likely to be affected, if not driven, by alternative normative per
spectives-alternative purposes or goals that those invoking or
applying the amended Rule impute to it, including deterrence,
punishment, professional responsibility and compensation.
We start with a fairly traditional, although rigorous, analysis
of the Rule's language and drafting history, with particular atten
tion devoted to the Advisory Committee Note. Our conclusion is
that the goal of the amended Rule is to deter abuse of the civil
litigation process through the detection and punishment (or dis
cipline) of violators. Compensation is merely a subsidiary objec
tive that may, but need not, be furthered through the choice of
sanctions and should be so pursued only to the extent that it can
be consistently with the goal of deterrence. Similarly, profes
sional responsibility is not a goal of the Rule, although the
-1

A. MILLER, THE AuGusT 1983 AME:-JDI>lENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CrviL

PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE \1AN,\GH1ENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY

I I (1984).
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rulemakers did hope to curb specific professional abuses by de
fining more precisely the duties of a lawyer who signs a paper
filed in federal district court.
Recognizing that this view of the Rule's language and draft
ing history is not shared by all commentators or courts and that
the Rule has proved to be an irresistible invitation to some of
both to pursue their own normative preferences, we consider at
length the effect of the alternatives on the interpretation and im
plementation of the Rule.
The R ule's Certification Standard

/:I.

As we discuss, the so-called "frivolousness" clause of Rule
1 1 's certification standard focuses on the conduct of the person
signing the paper that is filed. It would appear to require reason
able inquiry into the facts and the law and a good faith (honest)
conclusion based on such inquiry that the paper is "well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law. "5 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 also focuses on
conduct.G
Most courts, however, have interpreted this language to im
pose not j ust a duty of objectively reasonable inquiry and reflec
tion on the results of that inquiry but also a duty of objectively
reasonable conclusions.' In the Task Force's view, this supposed
requirement of reasonable conclusions is not supported by the
language of the Rule or the Advisory Committee Note . More im
portant, focusing on product (is the paper frivolous?) holds little
promise of advancing the goal of deterrence (specific or general),
or of upgrading the legal profession. It does, however, provide
maximum scope for fee-shifting if that is the judge's goal. Deci
sions imposing Rule 11 sanctions for signing a frivolous paper
are likely to tell the signer-and others-little that is useful in
avoiding future violations. The resulting unpredictability can
lead to over-deterrence, the kind of chilling effect that concerned
both critics of proposals to amend the Rule and the Advisory
FED. R. CI\'. P. 1 1.
"The new language stresses the need for some prcfiling mquirv illlo both the
facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative dutv imposecllw the rule. The standard is
one of reasonableness under the circumstances." FED. R. Cr\·. P. ll advisorv com5

ti

mittee note.

7 See, e.g., East way Const. Co. v. Citv of New York. 762 F.:!cl 2-!3, 25-± (2d Cir.
198:}); Zaldivar \'. City of Los "-\ngeles, 780 F.2d 323, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986).
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Committee.8
In the hard case where the lawyer has done a reasonable job
of investigating the facts and researching the law and has reached
an honest conclusion that the paper is "well grounded, etc.," to
impose Rule 1 1 sanctions is to define as an "abuse" disagree
ment about the significance of the facts or the tenor of the law.
We question whether Rule 1 1 is an appropriate, let alone the
best, way of dealing with professional incompetence that is not
deterrable . 9
The report's dichotomy between conduct and product is
drawn more sharply than the case law supports. Many courts fol
low both approaches, sometimes in the same case. Others use
product as a basis for inference about conduct. The Task Force
concluded that drawing the inference is appropriate in many
cases, so long as a demonstration that the Rule's stated require
ments were met suffices to defeat the imposition of sanctions for
a product that the court regards as frivolous. Moreover, when a
court is engaging in a process of inference, it should so state,
making clear that the person sanctioned has failed to rebut the
inference.
The report does not devote much attention to the Rule's
"improper purpose" clause. 10 The Task Force does, however,
question the approach taken by some courts, which would insu
late from sanctions a complaint that satisfies the "frivolousness
clause," no matter '.vhat purpose animated its filing. 11
B.

Procedure

The Advisory Committee was concerned about the costs of
litigating and adjudicating Rule 11 issues-so-called satellite liti
gation-and in their Note to the amended Rule encouraged pro
cedural minimalism. The Committee recognized, of course, the
8 A product approach need not have this result, if, as in the Third Circuit, trial

judges arc instructed that Rule II sanctions are reserved for "exceptional circum
stances." SPP, rg

.

ever.

Gaiardo \.Ethyl Corp., 83:) F.:?d -±79, 483 (3d Cir. 1987)

.

as indicated in the text, results (sanctions vs. no sanctions)

basis for choosing

an

are

How

not the onlv

approach. and a conduct approach is more Iikelv to advance

the goal of deterrence (without over-deterrence) and to promote professional re

sponsibility than is
'J

CJ. Doering

v.

a

product approach.

Union County Bel. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d

191. 196

n.-1 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Other proceedings such as disbarment exist to weed out in

compccent lawvcrs. Rule 11 was not [promulgated] for this purpose. but rather to
prO\'ide deterrence for abuses of the svstem of litigation in federal district courts.").
IO

II

Ste

supro

Sef', l:'.g

.

.

note 2.

Zaldic•ar, 780 F.2d at S31-3?.
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obligation to provide due process.1 2
One of the advantages of an approach to Rule 1 1 's certifica
tion standard that focuses on the paper (product) is its apparent
amenability to procedural minimalism. The judge, after all,
knows a frivolous paper when she sees it, particularly if the Rule
1 1 issue is reached after adjudication on the merits. A hearing
would, as Judge Posner stated in the context of Appellate Rule
38, be "pointless."13 Procedural minimalism may also, and inde
pendently, be encouraged by a compensation perspective, on the
view that expense-shifting sanctions are only money.
The Task Force rejects the notion that judges are infallible
even when the question is frivolousness. We found evidence that
monetary sanctions are not regarded as "only money" by those
upon whom such sanctions are imposed. We concluded that the
Constitution requires prior notice and opportunity to be heard in
almost all cases under Rule 1 1 .
Apart from the requirements of due process, neither the
goal of deterrence nor the perspective of professional responsi
bility is well served by procedural minimalism. Deterrence re
quires that both the court and the violator (as well as others who
pay attention to sanction decisions) understand what went
wrong. Dialogue may be necessary. Moreover, dialogue is neces
sary if the judge is to tailor the sanction to the facts. Perhaps the
dominance of expense-shifting sanctions in reported cases and in
the cases in our sanction survey reflects in part a conscious or
unconscious desire to avoid the costs of dialogue.
The Task Force also rejects the view that a motion for recon
sideration is an adequate substitute for prior notice and opportu
nity to be heard. For purposes of constitutional law, we found no
exceptional circumstances of the sort that are required for such a
12

Th e Advis o ry Comm ittee explained:
The procedure obvi o u s l y m u s t c o m p o rt w i th due p rocess requi rem e n t s .
T h e p a r t i c u l a r format to be fol l owed s h o u l d dep e n d on t h e c i rcum
stances of t h e s i tu a t i o n and t h e severity of t h e sanction u nder con sidera
tion. In many s i t u a t i o n s the judge's p a r t i c ipation in the proceedings
p rovides him wi th full knowl edge o f the rel e v a n t fac t s and l i t t le further
i n q u i ry wil l be necessary.
To a s s u re t h a t the efficiencies achieved th rough more effec tive op
e r a t i o n of t h e p l eading regimen w i l l n o t be offset by t h e c o s t of sat e l l i te
l i tiga t i o n over the i m p o s i t i o n of san c t i o n s , the court must to t h e ext e n t
p o s s i b le l i m i t t h e scope o f s a n c tion proceedings to t h e record. Thus,
dis covery s h o u ld be conducted o n lv by leave o f the c o u r t , a n d t hen o n l y
i n ext ra o rdinary c i rc u mstances.
FED. R. Cl\'. P . I 1 advisory com m ittee note.
1 3 Hil l v. i\!orfolk & Western Ry .. 814 F.2d 1192, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987)
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procedure. 14 Moreover, we were concerned about the effects of a
sanction-first-ask-questions-later approach on lawyers' attitudes,
and hence on clients' attitudes, towards the civil justice system.
Finally, we have evidence that, even on a narrow definition of
costs, the procedure may not be efficient, spawning elaborate
proceedings on reconsideration and, perhaps, appeals.
Indeed, on the same narrow view of costs the apparent effi
ciency of a product approach and/or of a compensatory perspec
tive may be a mirage. Frivolousness is in the eye of the beholder,
and the prospect of attorney's fees for a successful Rule 1 1 mo
tion may be hard to resist.1 5 Both a product approach 16 and a
compensatory perspective can encourage such motions. More
over, a compensatory perspective encourages the imputation of
rights to a party making a Rule 1 1 motion, including the right to
an explanation when the motion is denied.17 Finally, a product
approach may be thought to entail de novo appellate review1 8 and
hence lead to more appeals.
The prior "hearing" required need not in most cases be an
evidentiary hearing. Most Rule 11 issues (66.4 % ) in our sanction
survey were resolved, as they should have been resolved, on the
papers. Oral argument is appropriate in some cases, particularly
when the papers incline the judge to believe that a violation may
have occurred.
The Task Force rejects the notion that a party making a Rule
1 1 motion has any rights except the right to conscientious atten
tion to the requirements of the Rule by the trial judge. We rec
ommend that trial judges deny perfunctory Rule 11 motions
without awaiting a response and that they need not explain the
denial of such a motion. The imposition of Rule 1 1 sanctions, on
the other hand, requires explanation, which may also be im
portant from deterrence and professional responsibility
perspectlves.
1-l See FDIC v. i\Iallen, I 08 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 (1988) (a certain limited class of
cases demand prompt action).
1 "> C/ Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, J 540 (9th
Cir. 1986) ("In even a close case, \'-"·e think it cxtremelv unlikely th at a judge, who
has already decided that the Ia\'' is not as a lawyer argued it, will also decide that the
loser's position was warranted bv existing law.").
I !i But see sujJra note 8.
1 7 See, e.g., Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp .. 823 F.2d 1073, 1083-84
(7th Cir. i987). cert. disnn.1Jed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988).
IH See, eg, Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986).

"'
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Sanctions

C.

The Task Force takes the position that the sanction imposed
for a violation of Rule 1 1 should be the least severe sanction that
will achieve the purpose of specific deterrence. 19 Routine resort
to expense-shifting sanctions is inconsistent with the exercise of
discretion contemplated by the Rule. 2 0 Additionally, in many
cases, expense-shifting sanctions on an attorney's fee model will
be heavier or lighter than deterrence requires. Moreover, the at
torney's fee model brings with it a complicated jurisprudence2 1
that can only increase the costs of satellite litigation. Again, how
ever, it is perfectly appropriate for a court to impose an expense
shifting sanction (not necessarily full expense-shifting), if that
will advance the goal of specific deterrence and is otherwise indi
cated by consideration of the equities, including such matters as
the violator's ability to pay.22
The Task Force proposes a presumptive rule that Rule 1 1
sanctions be imposed on the lawyer who signs the paper found to
be in violation. The proposed presumptive rule has the advan
tage of reducing procedural costs, in particular the occasions for
evidentiary hearings to allocate responsibility between lawyer
and client. More important, it should mitigate the problem of
conflict of interest for the lawyer faced with a Rule 1 1 motion or
show cause order and, as well, the problem of official invasion of
a confidential relationship. The proposed presumptive rule will
not, however, eliminate conflicts or the possibility of overreach
ing. As to the latter, the Task Force believes it appropriate for a
court to forbid a lawyer vvhose p rimary responsibility is clear
from collecting a monetary sanction from the client. As to the
former, the question is one of comparative costs. To date, most
courts have simply ignored conflict problems. A few recent deci
sions suggest that they can no longer do so.:z3 Finally, the pro
posed presumptive rule is hardly ideal from the point of view of
1�) ."lccord, e.g. . Thomas v. Capitai Sec. Serv., Inc. 8 3 6 F.2d 8 6 6, 8 8 3 (5th Cir.
1 98 8) (en bane); Doering v. Union Countv Bd. of Chosen Freeholders. 857 F.2d
19 1 , 1 9 4 (3d Cir. 1988).
:zo The Advisory Commiuee exphined that "[t]he court . . . retains the nccessarv
flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has the discretion to
tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case." FED. R. C1v. P. I I advisorv
commiuee note.

:21 See, e.g., East way Con st. Corp.
Cir. 1 987) (Pratt, J. , dissenting) .
:2:2

�:-1

Ser Doering,
Sef !n

re

City of New York, 8 2 1 F . 2d 1 21 , 1 24-:25 (2d

857 F.2d at 1 9-1-97.
985 (6th

Ruben, 825 F.2d 977,

( 1988); Calloway

\.

v.

Cir. 1987), art. de111fd, I 08 S. Ct.

ll 08

klar\'el Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1456 (2d Cir.),
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deterrence. But neither, of course, is a system that allocates with
out inquiry.
D.

Appellate Review

The Task Force favors a unitary and deferential standard of
appellate review pursuant to which all Rule 1 1 determinations
would be reviewed for abuse of discretion.24 Such a standard re
spects the fact that the trial judge "has tasted the flavor of the
litigation"2 5 and that the question of sanctions is a matter of
"judgment and degree." 2 6 It also is less likely to stimulate ap
peals-satellite litigation in another orbit-than a standard which
treats the question of violation as a legal question, reviewable de
novo. The latter, of course, is a standard encouraged by a prod
uct approach. If a trial judge knows a frivolous paper when she
sees it, so too do the judges on the court of appeals.
Three courts of appeals have held or suggested that ex
penses of appeal are available for defending a Rule 1 1 sanction
successfully and/or for successfully challenging a denial of Rule
1 1 sanctions. 2 7 The Task Force rejects such a rule, finding
mandatory expenses inconsistent with the Rule's grant of discre
tion to the trial judge to fashion an appropriate sanction211 and
discretionary expenses too great a threat to the exercise of a stat
utory right.29 Expenses for challenging a denial will encourage
appeals, and both rules are of doubtful validity, either because
they conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 1 912 and Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38 or because they turn Rule 1 1 into a fee-shifting
Rule in violation of the Rules Enabling Act. '10 Finally, the data
cerl. granted

sub

110111.

Pavelic & LeFlore

v.

1116 ( 1988)
2-1

Marvel Entertainment Group, 109 S. Ct.

.-lccord, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d
G6. 68 (3d Cir. 1988), rer/. demed, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988); Thomas v. Capital Se c.
Sen., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871-73 (Sth Cir. 1988) (en bane). But 5ee, e.g., Zaldivar v.
Citv of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v. C BS, Inc.,
770 F.2cl 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
:.>'i fl'es/more{and, 770 F.2d at 1174.
:.>ti O'Connell v. Champion Int'l C or p , 812 F.2cl 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987).
:.>7 See Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988); Muthig
v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc. , 838 F.2d 600. 607 ( l st Cir. 1988); Jl'es/111oreland, 770
F.2d at ! 179-80. See also S.A. Auto Lube, Inc. v. JifTv Lube Int'l, Inc., 842 F.2d 94G,
950-5 I (7th Cir. 1988).
:.>H Sec .\lljJm note 20.
:.>'I CJ \Y ebst c r v. Sowders, 84() F.2d l 032. I 040 (Gth Cir. 1988) ("Appeals of
district court orders should not he deterred b,· threats fof Rule I I sanctions] from
district judges.").
:w See G aiar clo v. Ethyl Corp , 835 F.2cl 4/�J. 483 (3d Cir. 1987).
.
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from our appellate survey do not support the argument that ex
penses for successfully defending a monetary Rule 1 1 sanction
are necessary to secure the participation on appeal of the party to
whom the sanction was awarded by the district court.
IV.

EXPERIENCE UNDER

RU LE 1 1

The Task Force's empirical studies permit us to shed light
on questions that have been raised, and assertions that have been
made, about Rule 1 1 in judicial opinions and in the literature.
Some of our findings are of considerable interest nationally;
others are of limited utility outside the Third Circuit.
A.

Findings of National Interest
1.

The Unreliability of Statistics Based on Reported
Cases

By comparing the data from our sanction survey with data
available from published opinions and computerized data banks,
we were able to confirm the suspicion that available opinions rep
resent the tip of the iceberg. Published decisions account for
only 9. 1 % of Rule 1 1 dispositions in our survey and LEXIS for
only 39. 1 % . Moreover, published decisions suggest a ratio of
sanctions to cases (40 % ) far higher than the actual ratio ( 1 9.8 % ).
In addition, statistics based on reported decisions cannot
capture informal adjustments of Rule 1 1 issues, the role that
Rule 1 1 plays in the settlement or voluntary dismissal of cases, or
the role that warnings under Rule 1 1 play in advancing the goal
of deterrence. Twenty-two of the 1 32 Rule 1 1 motions in our
sanction survey were settled, withdrawn, resolved as part of the
settlement or dismissal of the case or otherwise mooted. We
know that in some cases a price was paid for settlement or with
drawal of the motion and that in others it played a causal role in
the termination of the case. We also know that about 50 % of the
district judges responding to our questionnaire warn about pos
sible Rule 1 1 violations and that the great majority of them be
lieve that these warnings are effective.
2.

Rule 1 1 Motions are Neither a Cottage Industry Nor
an Urban Phenomenon in the Third Circuit

We found, on the basis of our sanction survey, that Rule 1 1
motions were made in only approximately 1 /2 of one percent of
civil cases pending during the survey period (July 1 , 1 987 to June

I

l

j

'il
l

l
'
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30 , 1 98 8). Although it would be a mistake to extrapolate from
this finding to activity in other circuits, it should cause some
change in the rhetoric of the debate. More important, we hope
that our work will prompt further inquiry into the causes of high
or low rates of activity.
The Task Force suggests that contributing factors to high or
low rates of Rule 1 1 activity may include local legal culture (e.g.,
general attitudes towards sanctions and cooperation and collegi
ality), doctrine, and individual judicial attitudes towards Rule 1 1
sanctions as a case management device. Local legal culture, and
in particular the infiltration of New York's legal culture, seems to
play a part in the relatively high level of activity in New Jersey.31
Individual attitudes towards Rule 1 1 as a case-management de
vice may help to explain the very high sanctioning rate in the
Middle District of Pennsylvania.32 In any event, the Task Force
does not find urbanism a powerful explanatory concept in this
context.
3.

The Impact of Rule 1 1 on Plaintiffs and on Civil
Rights Plaintiffs

The Task Force's findings confirm conclusions based on re
ported decisions that the Rule has disproportionate impacts on
all plaintiffs and on civil rights plaintiffs in particular. Although
our findings are less striking than those previously published,
they are nonetheless cause for further inquiry.
Plaintiffs (and/or their counsel) were the targets of approxi
mately two-thirds of the Rule 1 1 motions in our sanction survey,
and they were sanctioned at a rate ( 1 5.9 % ) higher than the rate
for defendants (9. 1 %). Moreover, plaintiffs were the object of
77.8 % of all sanctions imposed, on motion and sua sponte, in the
survey period.
The Task Force regards this differential impact as wholly
predictable. Rule l2(a), providing 20 days for a defendant to file
an answer,33 creates circumstances in every case akin to the limi
tations time bind facing some plaintiffs. Complaints are thus, a
:11
The District of New Jersey accounted for forty-three of 132 Rule I I motions
during the survey period. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania had the next high
est level of activity, forty-two requests.
:1:.> The disti·ict judges in the Middle District of Pennsylvania imposed sanctions.
on motion, at a rate (9nO or 45;7o) far higher than that of the next highest district
(New Jersey- 8/36 or 22.2%).
:u The Rule provides:
DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS-WHEN AND HOW PRESENTED-
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priori, more likely targets than answers,34 and where expense
shifting sanctions are the norm, they may be an irresistible target,
at least for lawyers whose clients will pay for the motion. Contin
gency contracts are predominantly for plaintiffs, and contingent
fee lawyers have special reason to file Rule 11 motions only when
they are cost-justified.
Civil rights cases did not loom as large in our sanction sur
vey as in the statistics based on reported decisions. Yet, civil
rights plaintiffs and/or their lawyers were sanctioned at a rate
(47.1%) far higher than plaintiffs as a whole (15.9%) and higher
still than plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases (8.45%). The same
was true of counselled civil rights plaintiffs.35
The Task Force regards these findings as a matter for seri
ous concern, and we have only begun the search for possible ex
planations. In aid of that process, we suggest that it may be
useful to break down the category of "civil rights" cases, as by
discretely considering prisoner cases, pro se cases and section
BY PLEADING OR MOTION-MOTION FO R JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
(a) When Presented. A defendant shall serve an answer within 20 davs
after the service of the summons and complaint upon that defenda � t,
except when service is made under Rule 4 (e) and a different time is pre
scribed in the order of court under the statute of the United States or in
the statute or rule of court of the state. A party served with a pleading
stating a cross-claim against that party shall serve an answer thereto
within 20 days after the service upon that party. The plaintiff shall serve
a rep l y to a counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after service of
the answer or, if a repl y is ordered by the court, within 20 days after
service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The United
States or an officer or agency thereof shall serve an answer to the com
plaint or to a cross-cl aim, or a repl y to a counterclaim, within 60 days
after the service upon the United States attorney of the pleading in
which the claim is asserted. The service of a motion permitted under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different tim e is
fixed by order of the court: ( I ) if the court denies the m otion or
postpones its disposition umil the trial on the merits, the responsive
pleading shall be served within l 0 days after notice of the court's action;
(2) if the court grants a m otion for a m o re definite statement the respon
sive pleading shall be served within I 0 days after the service of the more
definite statement.
FED. R. C1v. P. 12 (a).
34 Complaints were the target of 50% of the motions for sanctions and sua
sponte impositions during the survey period. By contrast. answers accounted for
only 5 . 3%, and answers and Rule l2 ( b ) motions to dismiss together for only
12.1%. of the motions.
'\5 Counselled civil rights plaintiffs were sanctioned on motion at a rate (-!5.5;7o)
far higher than the rate for counselied plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases (8. 7 '1o ) .
The findings of disproportionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs and counselled
civil rights plaintiffs are statistically significant at a !eYe! of less than l;?'o.
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1 98 3 actions. Moreover, we regard section 1 98 3 actions as par
ticularly ill-suited for a product approach to Rule 1 1 , because the
law under section 1 98 3 is particularly "underdeterminate,"36 and
for a compensatory perspective, because expense-shifting sanc
tions pose a special risk of overdeterrence in this context.
B.

Findings of i\l!ore Limited Utility

The Task Force recognizes that some critics of Rule 1 1 will
be alarmed by its findings and conclusions about the benefits and
costs of the Rule in the Third Circuit37 and that some supporters
of the Rule will take those findings and conclusions as proof that
they were right all along. Both groups should recognize that
there is no bottom line in the report and should heed our cau
tions that any such assessment ( 1 ) is hardly the product of exact
science and (2) cannot, or at least should not, be exported to
other circuits. We know that the law is developing in different
ways in different parts of the country and that, apart from doc
trine, j udicial attitudes towards the Rule differ, as do local legal
cultures. In considering the benefits and costs of the Rule in the
Third Circuit, it is important to take account of attitudes towards
sanctions in general and towards collegiality and of the re
strained approach to the Rule that has been encouraged by our
court of appeals.
The Task Force found evidence of quite widespread effects
on conduct of the sort hoped for by the rulemakers. Some
4 3.5 % of those responding to our questionnaire reported an ef
fect on pre-filing factual inquiry; 34 . 5 % saw impact on pre-filing
legal inquiry, and 22. 1 % experienced an effect on their practice
in counselling clients not to file a complaint. I t is obvious from
the commen ts and from our attorney interviews that many law
yers in this circuit are more careful as a result of amended Rule
:Hi S o l u m . On the lndetenn znacy Cmzs: Cntiqu ing Critical Dogma , 5-t U. C H I . L . R E v .

4 6 2 , 4 73 ( I 98 7 ) . SeP C i t v of S t . Lou i s
:17

v.

Pra p ro t n i k , 1 08 S . C t . 9 1 5 , 9 2 2 ( 1 98 8 ) .

The report concludes:

( I ) Rul e l l is n o t a cottage i n d u s t rv , and R u l e I I motions are n o t rou
tine, i n the Third C i rc u i t ; (2) R u l e I I h a s had effects on the p re-fi l i n g
c o n d u c t o f m a n y a t t o rn eys i n t h i s c i rcui t of t h e sort h o p e d for by t h e
r u l e makers and h a s yielded o th e r benefi t s ; ( 3 ) t h e c o s t s direct l y associ
a t ed w 1 t h R u l e I I ' s effects o n conduct here do n o t ap pear to b e clearlv
i n co m m e n s urate w i t h t h e p r o b a b l e b e n e fi t s accru i n g from t h o s e effe c t s ;
a n d (4 ) o t h er cos t s are n o t presen t l y . b u t mav soon b e , a sou rce of seri
o u s concern.

R U L E 1 1 IN TR.\ N S IT I O N , supra n o t e 3. at 95.
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1 1 and that many view the changes in their practice with
satisfaction.
We also found evidence of benefits in connection with the
settlement or dismissal of cases, and in the perceived effective
ness of warnings by judges issuing them. Both effects, however,
require careful evaluation because of the danger of unjus tified
coercwn.
The major cos ts of Rule 1 1 focused on by its critics are the
cos ts of satellite litigation. Various data from our empirical s tud
ies led us to conclude that, in the Third Circuit, these cos ts are
not clearly incommensurate with the Rule's probable benefits.
Lawyers do not seem to be spending a great deal of time on Rule
1 1 motions, particularly those that are denied, and neither the
procedures used nor the modes of disposition in the cases in our
sanction survey suggest an undue burden on dis trict courts. Sin
gle-issue Rule 1 1 appeals are, on the other hand, quite expen
sive, but we expect the incidence of such appeals-which were
not numerous in our one year survey period-to decline .
The Task Force was also unable to conclude, on the basis of
the available data, that the collateral costs of Rule 1 1 are pres
ently a serious concern in the Third Circuit, al though we are wor
ried that some of them may soon be. Only approximately one
quarter of the respondents to our attorney ques tionnaire per
ceived that the amended Rule has chilled legal development, and
in the same group of respondents only 5 % reported an effect on
their practice in seeking extension or change in the law.3H Nor
does it appear that the amended Rule has poisoned relations be
tween lawyers and clients or lawyers and judges , although it has
had a s tronger negative effect on lawyer-lawyer relations.'3�)
Our initial inquiries suggest, however, that the Rule may
soon have an effect on malpractice insurance availability or rates
that should raise considerable concern, and its impact on bar dis
cipline and other professional aspects deserves further s tudy.
Pending such s tudy, we believe courts imposing Rule 1 1 sanc
tions should consider possible collateral consequences and err
on the side of not causing them to be incurred .
:Hl A n u m b e r of p a r t i ci p a n t s at t h e T h i rd C i rc u i t J u d i c i a l C o n ference regarded
this fin d i n g a s cause for concern , p o i n t i n g out that in that group might b e t h o s e
lawyers w h o w e r e prev i o u s l y m o s t d i s p o s e d and b e s t equipped t o expand our l egal

horizons.
')9 Agai n , t here were t h o s e a t t h e Third Circuit .J udicial C o n ference ,,· h o decried
t h e " co rros ive" effects o f the amended Rule.
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CONCLUS ION

Amended Rule 1 1 was an experiment. It probably took too
little time to conceive-certainly it was based on virtually no em
p irical data."10 It will require a good deal of time to implement
and to evaluate. The Task Force's work is an attempt to substi
tute facts for speculation. The report provides no definitive an
swers . We need more facts. If our work stimulates further
studies,4 1 I shall consider it a great success.
-1 0 See Burbank, The Tra nsformation of A merican Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule
1 1 , 137 U. PA. L . REV. 192 5 , 1 92 7 ( 1 989).
-I I The Task Force's fir s t recommendation i s that " [a ) s i milar s tudy should be
undertaken in a circ u i t with a d ifferen t repu tation regarding, and (as evidenced by
case l aw) different normative perspectives on, Rule I I sanction s . " RuLE I I I N
TRANSITION, supra n o t e t . I have personally nomina ted the Seventh C i rcui t for such
a study. See Burbank, s upra note 40, a t 1957-58.

